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BRYAN v. ITASCA COUNTY
Syllabus

BRYAN v. ITASCA COUNTY, MINNESOTA
CERTIORARI

No. 75-5027.

TO THE SUPREME

COURT OF MINNESOTA

Argued April 20, 1976--Decided June 14, 1976

Petitioner, an enrolled Chippewa Indian, brought this suit in state
court seeking a declaratory judgment that the State of Minnesota
and respondent county lacked authority to impose a personal
property tax on his mobile home located on land held in trust for
members of his tribe and that imposition of such a tax contravened federal law. The trial court rejected the contention. The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the grant of
civil jurisdiction to the State in § 4 (a) of Pub. L. 280 includes
taxing authority and since § 4 (b) does not exempt nontrust
property from such authority, the county had power to assess
the tax. Section 4 (a) gave various States, including Minnesota,
with respect to all Indian country within the State except as specifically exempted "jurisdiction over civil causes of action between
Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of
Indian country listed . . . to the same extent that such State ...
has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil
laws of such State . . . that are of general application to private
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the
State . . . ." Though tax laws are not specifically mentioned,
the State Supreme Court concluded that they were included since
the exempting provision, § 4 (b), does not exempt nontrust
property, but states that "[n]othing in this section shall authorize
the . . . taxation of any real or personal property . . . belonging
to any Indian or any Indian tribe ... that is held in trust by the
United States . . . ." Held: Public Law 280 did not grant States
the authority to impose taxes on reservation Indians. Pp. 379-393.
(a) The central focus of Pub. L. 280, embodied in § 2 of the
Act, was to confer on the States criminal jurisdiction with respect to crimes involving Indians, and no mention was made of a
congressional intent to authorize the States to tax Indians or
Indian property on Indian reservations, a significant omission in
light of applying the canons of construction to statutes affecting
Indian immunities, where some mention would normally be expected had Congress contemplated a sweeping change in the status
of reservation Indians. Pp. 379-383.
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(b) Section 4 (a) seems to have been intended primarily to
provide a state forum for resolving private legal disputes involving
Indians. Pp. 383-386.
(c) When Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 amended
Pub. L. 280 to require tribal consent to any new state jurisdiction Congress in effect characterized the relevant part of Pub. L.
280 as conferring the power to resolve private civil controversies,
and the legislative history of Title IV would make it difficult to
construe § 4 jurisdiction acquired pursuant to that Title as extending general state regulatory power, including taxing power,
to govern Indian reservations. Pp. 386-387.
(d) Public L. 280 was plainly not meant to effect total assimilation, and nothing in its legislative history suggests otherwise. The
same Congress that enacted Pub. L. 280 also enacted several termination Acts, indicating that Congress well knew how directly to
express its intent to confer upon the States general civil regulatory powers, including taxation. Pp. 387-390.
(e) Section 4 (b), which is "entirely consistent with, and in
effect . . . a reaffirmation of, the law as it stood prior to its enactment," Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F. 2d 863, 866 (CA9), should,
as an admittedly ambiguous statute, be construed in favor of the
Indians and against abolishing their tax immunities by implication. Pp. 390-393.
303 Minn. 395, 228 N. W. 2d 249, reversed.
BRENNAN,

J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Bernard P. Becker argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the brief were Gerald L. Seck, Michael
Hagedorn, and Daniel H. Israel.
C. H. Luther, Deputy Attorney General of Minnesota, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
brief were Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, and
Paul R. Kempainen and Steven G. Thorne, Special Assistant Attorneys General.*
*Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Harry R.
Sachse, Edmund B. Clark, and Jacques B. Gelin filed a brief for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal.
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Mn. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question reserved in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 178
n. 18 (1973): whether the grant of civil jurisdiction to
the States conferred by § 4 of Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 589,
28 U. S. C. § 1360, is a congressional grant of power to
the States to tax reservation Indians except insofar as
taxation is expressly excluded by the terms of the statute.
Petitioner Russell Bryan, an enrolled member of the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,' resides in a mobile home
on land held in trust by the United States for the Chippewa Tribe on the Leech Lake Reservation in Minnesota.
In June 1972, petitioner received notices from the
auditor of respondent Itasca County, Minn., that he had
been assessed personal property tax liability on the mobile home totaling $147.95. Thereafter, in September
1972, petitioner brought this suit in the Minnesota District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the State
and county were without authority to levy such a tax on
personal property of a reservation Indian on the reservation and that imposition of such a tax was contrary to
federal law. The Minnesota District Court rejected the
contention and entered judgment for respondent county.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, 303 Minn. 395,
228 N. W. 2d 249 (1975). We granted certiorari, 423
U. S. 923 (1975), and now reverse.
I
Principles defining the power of States to tax reserva1 The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a federally recognized tribe
with a constitution approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae 2 n. 2. Its reservation was established by the Treaty of Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165.
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tion Indians and their property and activities on federally established reservations were clarified in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra. As summarized in its companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973), McClanahan concluded:
"[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent
cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority
for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income
from activities carried on within the boundaries of
the reservation, and McClanahan... lays to rest any
doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation
is not permissible absent Congressional consent."
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 148.2
The McClanahan principle derives from a general pre-emption
analysis, 411 U. S., at 172, that gives effect to the plenary and exclusive power of the Federal Government to deal with Indian tribes,
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 554 n. 11 (1975); Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551-552 (1974); Board of Comm'rs v.
Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 715-716 (1943), and "to regulate and protect
the Indians and their property against interference even by a state,"
id., at 715. This pre-emption analysis draws support from "the
'backdrop' of the Indian sovereignty doctrine," Moe v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 475 (1976); "'[t]he policy of
leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control [which] is
deeply rooted in the Nation's history,'" McClanahan, 411 U. S., at
168; and the extensive federal legislative and administrative regulation of Indian tribes and reservations, id., at 173-179. "Congress
has . . . acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have
no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation,"
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959), and therefore "'State
laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian
reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State
laws shall apply.'"
McClanahan, supra, at 170-171 (quoting
United States Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845
(1958)).
Of course, this pre-emption model usually yields different conclusions as to the application of state laws to tribal Indians who
2
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McClanahan held that Arizona was disabled in the absence of congressional consent from imposing a state
income tax on the income of a reservation Indian earned
solely on the reservation. On the authority of McClanahan, Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463
(1976), held this Term that in the absence of congressional consent the State was disabled from imposing a
personal property tax on motor vehicles owned by tribal
members living on the reservation, or a vendor license
fee applied to a reservation Indian conducting a business
for the tribe on reservation land, or a sales tax as applied
to on-reservation sales by Indians to Indians.
Thus McClanahan and Moe preclude any authority
in respondent county to levy a personal property tax
upon petitioner's mobile home in the absence of congressional consent. Our task therefore is to determine
whether § 4 of Pub. L. 280, 28 U. S. C. § 1360, constitutes such consent.
Section 4 (a), 28 U. S. C. § 1360 (a), provides:
"Each of the States . . . listed in the following

table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of
action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country
listed . . .to the same extent that such State . . .

has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and
those civil laws of such State ...that are of general

application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the
State

...

have left or never inhabited federally established reservations, or
Indians "who do not possess the usual accoutrements of tribal selfgovernment," McClanahan,supra, at 167-168; see Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 411 U. S., at 148-149.
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"Minnesota .. . A11 Indian country within the State,

except the Red Lake Reservation."
The statute does not in terms provide that the tax laws
of a State are among "civil laws . . .of general applica-

tion to private persons or private property." The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded, however, that they
were, finding in § 4 (b) of the statute a negative implication of inclusion in § 4 (a) of a general power of tax.
Section 4 (b), 28 U. S. C. § 1360 (b), provides:
"Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to
any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community
that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States; or shall authorize regulation of
the use of such property in a manner inconsistent
with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or
with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall
confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in
probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or
right to possession of such property or any interest
therein."
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that "unless
paragraph (a) is interpreted as a general grant of the
power to tax, then the exceptions contained in paragraph
(b) are limitations on a nonexistent power." 303 Minn.,
at 402, 228 N. W. 2d, at 253. Therefore, the state
court held: "Public Law 280 is a clear grant of the power
3The State Supreme Court relied upon Omaha Tribe of Indians
v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421 (1974), aff'd, 516 F. 2d 133 (CA8 1975),
where the District Court for the District of Nebraska gave the same
construction to Pub. L. 280 in upholding a state income tax levied
against reservation Indian income.
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to tax." Id., at 406, 228 N. W. 2d, at 256.4 We disagree. That conclusion is foreclosed by the legislative history of Pub. L. 280 and the application of
canons of construction applicable to congressional statutes claimed to terminate Indian immunities.
II
The primary concern of Congress in enacting Pub. L.
280 that emerges from its sparse legislative history was
with the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions
for law enforcement. See Goldberg, Public Law 280:
The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 535, 541-542 (1975). The
House Report states:
"These States lack jurisdiction to prosecute Indians for most offenses committed on Indian reservations or other Indian country, with limited
exceptions. The applicability of Federal criminal
laws in States having Indian reservations is also
limited. The United States district courts have a
measure of jurisdiction over offenses committed on
Indian reservations or other Indian country by or
against Indians, but in cases of offenses committed
by Indians against Indians that jurisdiction is
limited to the so-called 10 major crimes: murder,
manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent to
kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny.
"As a practical matter, the enforcement of law
Petitioner had not properly raised a claim that his-mobile home
was in fact annexed to tribal trust land and therefore a part of the
real property expressly excluded from taxation by § 4 (b). The
Minnesota Supreme Court found, therefore, that the mobile home
was personal property taxable as such under Minnesota law.
4
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and order among the Indians in the Indian country
has been left largely to the Indian groups themselves. In many States, tribes are not adequately
organized to perform that function; consequently,
there has been created a hiatus in law-enforcement
authority that could best be remedied by conferring
criminal jurisdiction on States indicating an ability

and willingness to accept such responsibility."
H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6
(1953).
Thus, provision for state criminal jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against Indians on the reservations was the central focus of Pub. L. 280 and is embodied in § 2 of the Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1162.'
5 This House Report and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 699, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), are in all material respects identical. All
citations herein are to the House Report.
6 Section 2 of Pub. L. 280, 18 U. S. C. § 1162, provides:
"State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians
in the Indian country.
"(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table
shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians
in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State
or Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has
jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or
Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the State or Territory:
"State or
Indian country affected
Territory of
"Minnesota .....

All Indian country within the State, except the
Red Lake Reservation.

"(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or com-
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In marked contrast in the legislative history is the virtual absence of expression of congressional policy or intent respecting § 4's grant of civil jurisdiction to the
States. Of special significance for our purposes, however, is the total absence of mention or discussion regarding a congressional intent to confer upon the States
an authority to tax Indians or Indian property on
reservations. Neither the Committee Reports nor the
floor discussion in either House mentions such authority.7
This omission has significance in the application of the
canons of construction applicable to statutes affecting Indian immunities, as some mention would normally be
expected if such a sweeping change in the status of tribal
government and reservation Indians had been contemplated by Congress.' The only mention of taxation authority is in a colloquy between Mr. Sellery, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Congressman
Young during House committee hearings on Pub. L. 280.
That colloquy strongly suggests that Congress did not
mean to grant tax authority to the States:
"Mr. Young. Does your bill limit the provision
munity that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or
shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner
inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with
any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian
or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege,
or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute
with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing,
or regulation thereof.
"(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter
shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed
in subsection (a) of this section as areas over which the several
States have exclusive jurisdiction."
799 Cong. Rec. 9962, 10782-10784, 10928 (1953).
8 See Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and
Economic Development, 49 N. D. L. Rev. 267, 292 (1973).
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for Federal assistance to States in defraying the
increased expenses of the courts in connection
with the widening of the jurisdiction that the bill
encompasses?
"Mr. Sellery. No; it does not.
"Mr. Young. Do you think it would be necessary
to provide for some payment, inasmuch as the great
portion of Indian lands are not subject to taxation?
"Mr. Sellery. . . . Generally, the Department's
views are that if we started on the processes of Federal financial assistance or subsidization of law enforcement activities among the Indians, it might
turn out to be a rather costly program, and it is a
problem which the States should deal with and
accept without Federal financial assistance; otherwise there will be some tendency, the Department
believes, for the Indian to be thought of and perhaps to think of himself because of the financial
assistance which comes from the Federal Government as still somewhat a member of a race or group
which is set apart from other citizens of the State.
And it is desired to give him and the other citizens
of the State the feeling of a conviction that he is in
the same status and has access to the same services,
including the courts, as other citizens of the State
who are not Indians.
"Mr. Young. That would not quite be true,
though; would it? Because for the most part he
does not pay any taxes.
"Mr. Sellery. No. There is that difference.
"Mr. Young. A rather sizable difference in not
paying for the courts or paying for the increased
expenses for judicial proceedings.
"Mr. Sellery. The Indians, of course, do pay
other forms of taxes. I do not know how the courts
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of Nevada are supported financially, but the Indians
do pay the sales tax and other taxes.
"Mr. Young. But no income tax or corporation
tax or profits tax. You understand a large portion
of the land is held in trust and therefore is not subject to tax.
"Mr. Sellery. That is correct.
"Mr. Young. So far as my State is concerned, it
would be a large burden on existing costs of judicial
procedure. I think it is only right that the Federal
Government should make some contribution for
that. You seem to differentiate. I think there is a
differentiation, too, in that they are not paying
taxes.
"Mr. Sellery. I will concede your point that they
are not paying taxes. The Department has recommended, nevertheless, that no financial assistance be
afforded to the States." App. 55-56.1
Piecing together as best we can the sparse legislative
history of § 4, subsection (a) seems to have been primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate Indian
forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private
citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide
such disputes; this is definitely the import of the statutory wording conferring upon a State "jurisdiction over
civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians
are parties which arise in . . .Indian country.., to the
same extent that such State . . .has jurisdiction over
other civil causes of action." With this as the primary
9Unpublished Transcript of Hearings on H. R. 1063 before the

Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). The transcript
was produced by the United States during the briefing of Tonasket
v. Washington, 411 U. S. 451 (1973). The portion quoted in the
text is reproduced in the Appendix in the instant case.
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focus of § 4 (a), the wording that follows in § 4 (a)"and those civil laws of such State. . . that are of general
application to private persons or private property shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State"-authorizes
application by the state courts of their rules of decision
to decide such disputes."° Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1652. This
construction finds support in the consistent and uncontradicted references in the legislative history to "permitting" "State courts to adjudicate civil controversies"
arising on Indian reservations, H. R. Rep. No. 848, pp.
5, 6 (emphasis added), and the absence of anything
remotely resembling an intention to confer general state
civil regulatory control over Indian reservations. 1 In
10 Cf. Israel & Smithson, supra,n. 8, at 296:

"A fair reading of these two clauses suggests that Congress never
intended 'civil laws' to mean the entire array of state noncriminal
laws, but rather that Congress intended 'civil laws' to mean those
laws which have to do with private rights and status. Therefore,
'civil laws . . . of general application to private persons or private
property' would include the laws of contract, tort, marriage, divorce,
insanity, descent, etc., but would not include laws declaring or implementing the states' sovereign powers, such as the power to tax,
grant franchises, etc. These are not within the fair meaning of
'private' laws."
11 Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the title of
Pub. L. 280, H. R. Rep. No. 848, p. 3: "A bill to confer jurisdiction
on the States . . . , with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes
of action committed or arising on Indian reservations within such
States, and for other purposes" (the other purposes being § 8's withdrawal from the affected areas of the operation of the Federal Indian
Liquor Laws, and §§ 6-7's provision of a method whereby additional
States could assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations). Additionally, this interpretation is buttressed by § 4 (c),
which provides that "any tribal ordinance or custom . . . adopted by
an Indian tribe . . . in the exercise of any authority which it may
possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the
State, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil
causes of action pursuant to this section" (emphasis added). Fi-
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short, the consistent and exclusive use of the terms
"civil causes of action," "aris[ing] on," "civil laws ... of
general application to private persons or private property," and "adjudicat[ion] ," in both the Act and its legislative history virtually compels our conclusion that the
primary intent of § 4 was to grant jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state
court.
Furthermore, certain tribal reservations were completely exempted from the provisions of Pub. L. 280
precisely because each had a "tribal law-and-order organization that functions in a reasonably satisfactory
manner."

H. R. Rep. No. 848, p. 7.12

Congress plainly

nally, reading § 4 (a) as an integrated whole, with the reference to
state civil law as intended to provide the rules of decision for the
private civil causes of action over which state courts were granted
jurisdiction is consistent with § 3 of Pub. L. 280, which codifies § 4 in Title 28 of the United States Code. That Title collects
Acts of Congress governing jurisdiction and the judiciary. Section
4 would be expected to be codified in Title 25, governing Indian
affairs if general state regulatory power over Indian reservations
were being granted. Indeed, § 4 is entitled, as provided in Pub.
L. 280 and codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1360, "State civil jurisdiction in
actions to which Indians are parties."
12 Tribal groups in the affected States which were exempted from
the coverage of Pub. L. 280 because they had "reasonably satisfactory law-and-order" organizations, had objected to the extension
of state criminal and civil jurisdiction on various grounds. Three
of the tribes exempted objected due to their fear of inequitable
treatment of reservation Indians in the state courts. H. R. Rep.
No. 848, pp. 7-8. Two of the objecting tribes expressed the fear
that "the extension of State law to their reservations would result
in the loss of various rights." Id., at 8. One tribe objected on
the ground that its members were "not yet ready to be subjected
to State laws." Ibid. Certainly if abolition of traditional Indian
immunity from state taxation, except insofar as expressly excluded,
was an anticipated result of Pub. L. 280's extension of civil jurisdiction, vehement Indian objections on this specific ground would
also have been voiced.
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meant only to allow state courts to decide criminal and
civil matters arising on reservations not so organized.
Accordingly, rather than the expansive reading given § 4
(a) by the Minnesota Supreme Court, we feel that the
construction we give the section is much more consonant
with the revealed congressional intent. Moreover, our
construction is consistent with our prior references to § 4
as "the extension of state jurisdiction over civil causes of
action by or against Indians arising in Indian country."
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423,
427 (1971). See also id., at 424 n. 1; id., at 430-431
(STEWART, J., dissenting); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 687 n. 3 (1965);
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404, 416
n. 8 (1968) (STEWART, J., dissenting).
Our construction is also more consistent with Title IV
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 78, 25 U. S. C.
§§ 1321-1326. Title IV repeals § 7 of Pub. L. 280 and
requires tribal consent as a condition to further state assumptions of the jurisdiction provided in 18 U. S. C.
§ 1162 and 28 U. S. C. § 1360. Section 402 of Title IV,
25 U. S. C. § 1322, tracks the language of § 4 of
Pub. L. 280. Section 406 of Title IV, 25 U. S. C.
§ 1326, which provides for Indian consent, refers to "State
jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter with
respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action ....

.

It is true, of course, that the primary interpretation of § 4
must have reference to the legislative history of the
Congress that enacted it rather than to the history of
Acts of a later Congress. Nevertheless, Title IV of the
1968 Act is intimately related to § 4, as it provides the
method for further state assumptions of the jurisdiction
conferred by § 4, and we previously have construed the
effect of legislation affecting reservation Indians in light
of "intervening" legislative enactments. Moe v. Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S., at 472-475. It would be
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difficult to suppose that Congress in 1968 intended the
meaning of § 4 to vary depending upon the time and
method by which particular States acquired jurisdiction. And certainly the legislative history of Title IV
makes it difficult to construe § 4 jurisdiction acquired
pursuant to Title IV as extending general state civil
regulatory authority, including taxing power, to govern Indian reservations. Senator Ervin, who offered and
principally sponsored Title IV, see Kennerly v. District
Court of Montana, supra, at 429 n. 5, referred to § 1360
civil jurisdiction as follows:
"Certain representatives of municipalities have
charged that the repeal of [§ 7 of] Public Law
280 would hamper air and water pollution controls
and provide a haven for undesirable, unrestricted
business establishments within tribal land borders.
Not only does this assertion show the lack of faith
that certain cities have in the ability and desire of
Indian tribes to better themselves and their environment, but, most importantly, it is irrelevant, since
Public Law 280 relates primarily to the application of state civil and criminal law in court proceedings, and has no bearing on programs set up by the
States to assist economic and environmental development in Indian territory."
(Emphasis added.)
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs
of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, No. 90-23, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 136 (1968).
III
Other considerations also support our construction.
Today's congressional policy toward reservation Indians
may less clearly than in 1953 favor their assimilation,
but Pub. L. 280 was plainly not meant to effect total
assimilation. Public L. 280 was only one of many types
of assimilationist legislation under active consideration
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in 1953. H. R. Rep. No. 848, pp. 3-5; Santa Rosa
Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F. 2d 655, 662
(CA9 1975)." And nothing in its legislative history
remotely suggests that Congress meant the Act's extension of civil jurisdiction to the States should
result in the undermining or destruction of such tribal
governments as did exist and a conversion of the affected
tribes into little more than " 'private, voluntary organizations,'" United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557
(1975)-a possible result if tribal governments and reservation Indians were subordinated to the full panoply
of civil regulatory powers, including taxation, of state
and local governments."
The Act itself refutes such an
13The legislative history of Pub. L. 280 does contain a congressional expression that "the Indians of several States have reached
a stage of acculturation and development that makes desirable
extension of State civil jurisdiction to the Indian country." H. R.
Rep. No. 848, p. 6. But not too much can be made of this unelaborated statement; its thrust is too difficult to reconcile with
the focus of Pub. L. 280-extending state jurisdiction to those
reservations with the least developed and most inadequate tribal
legal institutions; presumably those tribes evincing the least "acculturation and development" in terms of the mainstream of American society. See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State
Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 535,
543 (1975).
14Much has been written on the subject of a devastating impact on tribal governments that might result from an interpretation
of § 4 as conferring upon state and local governments general civil
regulatory control over reservation Indians. Santa Rosa Band of
Indians v. Kings County, 532 F. 2d 655, 662-663, 666-668 (CA9
1975); Goldberg, supra; Note, The Extension of County Jurisdiction Over Indian Reservations in California: Public Law 280
and the Ninth Circuit, 25 Hastings L. J. 1451 (1974); Comment,
Indian, Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59
Calif. L. Rev. 1261 (1971). The suggestion is that since tribal
governments are disabled under many state laws from incorporating
as local units of government, Goldberg, supra, at 581, general regulatory control might relegate tribal governments to a level below
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inference: there is notably absent any conferral of state
jurisdiction over the tribes themselves, and § 4 (c), 28

U. S. C. § 1360 (c), providing for the "full force and
effect" of any tribal ordinances or customs "heretofore

or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe ... if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State," con-

templates the continuing vitality of tribal government.
Moreover, the same Congress that enacted Pub. L.
280 also enacted several termination Acts "5 -legislation

which is cogent proof that Congress knew well how to
express its intent directly when that intent was to subject reservation Indians to the full sweep of state laws
and state taxation. Cf. Board of Comm'rs v. Seber, 318
U. S. 705, 713 (1943); Goudy v. Meath, 203 U. S. 146,

149

(1906).

These

termination

enactments

provide

expressly for subjecting distributed property "and any
income derived therefrom by the individual, corporation,
or other legal entity . . . to the same taxes, State and
Federal, as in the case of non-Indians,"

25 U.

S. C.

that of counties and municipalities, thus essentially destroying them,
particularly if they might raise revenue only after the tax base had
been filtered through many governmental layers of taxation. Present federal policy appears to be returning to a. focus upon strengthening tribal self-government, see, e. g., Indian Financing Act of 1974,
88 Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V); Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat.
2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expressed the view that courts "are
not obliged in ambiguous instances to strain to implement [an assimilationist] policy Congress has now rejected, particularly where to do
so will interfere with the present congressional approach to what is,
after all, an ongoing relationship." Santa Rosa Band of Indians v.
Kings County, supra, at 663.
1 68 Stat. 718, 25 U. S. C. § 564 (Klamath Tribe); 68 Stat. 768,
25 U. S. C. §§ 721-728 (Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas);
68 Stat. 1099, 25 U. S. C. §§ 741-760 (Paiute Indians of Utah);
68 Stat. 250, 25 U. S. C. §§ 891-901 (Menominee Tribe of
Wisconsin).
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§§ 564j, 749, 898, and provide that "all statutes of the
United States which affect Indians because of their status
as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of
the tribe, and the laws of the several States shall apply
to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they
apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction." 25 U. S. C. §§ 564q, 757, 899; cf. 25 U. S. C. § 726.
These contemporaneous termination Acts are in pari
materia with Pub. L. 280. Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U. S., at 411. Reading this express language
respecting state taxation and application of the full range
of state laws to tribal members of these contemporaneous termination Acts, the negative inference is that
Congress did not mean in § 4 (a) to subject reservation Indians to state taxation. Thus, rather than
inferring a negative implication of a grant of general taxing power in § 4 (a) from the exclusion of certain taxation in § 4 (b), we conclude that construing Pub. L. 280
in pari materia with these Acts shows that if Congress in
enacting Pub. L. 280 had intended to confer upon the
States general civil regulatory powers, including taxation, over reservation Indians, it would have expressly
said so.
IV
Additionally, we note that § 4 (b), excluding "taxation of any real or personal property . . . belonging to
any Indian or any Indian tribe ... that is held in trust by
the United States or is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States," is not obviously the narrow exclusion of state taxatiop that the
Minnesota Supreme Court read it to be. On its face
the statute is not clear whether the exclusion is applicable only to taxes levied directly on the trust property
specifically, or whether it also excludes taxation on activi-
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ties taking place in conjunction with such property and
income deriving from its use. And even if read narrowly
to apply only to taxation levied against trust property
directly, § 4 (b) certainly does not expressly authorize all
other state taxation of reservation Indians.
Moreover, the express prohibition of any "alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation" of any trust property can be
read as prohibiting state courts, acquiring jurisdiction
over civil controversies involving reservation Indians
pursuant to § 4, from applying state laws or enforcing judgments in ways that would effectively result
in the "alienation, encumbrance, or taxation" of trust
property. Indeed, any other reading of this provision of
§ 4 (b) is difficult to square with the identical prohibition contained in § 2 (b) of the Act, which applies
the same restrictions upon States exercising criminal
jurisdiction over reservation Indians. It would simply
make no sense to infer from the identical language of
§ 2 (b) a general power in § 2 (a) to tax Indians in all
other respects since § 2 (a) deals only with criminal
jurisdiction.
Indeed, § 4 (b) in its entirety may be read as simply
a reaffirmation of the existing reservation Indian-Federal
Government relationship in all respects save the conferral of state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate private
civil causes of action involving Indians. We agree with
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that § 4 (b)
"is entirely consistent with, and in effect is a reaffirmation of, the law as it stood prior to its enactment."
Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F. 2d 863, 865-866 (1957).
The absence of more precise language respecting state
taxation of reservation Indians is entirely consistent
with a general uncertainty in 1953 of the precise
limits of state power to tax reservation Indians
respecting other than their trust property, and a con-
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gressional intent merely to reaffirm the existing law whatever subsequent litigation might determine it to be.
Finally, in construing this "admittedly ambiguous"
statute, Board of Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U. S., at 713,
we must be guided by that "eminently sound and vital
canon," Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425
U. S. 649, 655 n. 7 (1976), that "statutes passed for
the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be

liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians." Alaska Pacific
Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918).
See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 (1912); Antoine
v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 199-200 (1975).
This
principle of statutory construction has particular force
in the face of claims that ambiguous statutes abolish by
implication Indian tax immunities. McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 174; Squire v.
Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw,
280 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1930). "This is so because ...
Indians stand in a special relation to the federal government from which the states are excluded unless the
Congress has manifested a clear purpose to terminate [a
tax] immunity and allow states to treat Indians as part
of the general community." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
United States, 319 U. S. 598, 613-614 (1943) (Murphy,
J., dissenting). What we recently said of a claim that
16 Congress would have been fully justified in 1953 in being uncertain as to state power to levy a personal property tax on reservation Indians. No decision of this Court directly resolved the
issue until Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976),
decided earlier this Term. It appears that the only decision of
this Court prior to 1953 dealing with state power to levy a personal property tax on reservation Indians was United States v.
Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, 443-444 (1903), which held exempt from
state taxation personal Indian property purchased with federal funds.
See United States Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law
865 (1958).
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Congress had terminated an Indian reservation by means
of an ambiguous statute is equally applicable here to the
respondent's claim that § 4 (a) of Pub. L. 280 is a clear
grant of power to tax, and hence a termination of traditional Indian immunity from state taxation:
"Congress was fully aware of the means by which
termination could be effected. But clear termination language was not employed in the . . . Act.
This being so, we are not inclined to infer an intent to terminate ....
A congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of
the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history." Mattz v. Arnett,
412 U. S. 481, 504-505 (1973).
The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is
Reversed.

